The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon;
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers,
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not.--Great God! I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.
-William Wordsworth
The first chapter of Ray Brassier's new book is online (links found
here) and I have heard some good things about it...
The end of the chapter promises exciting developments later in the book, for example: "The philosophical consumation of Enlightenment consists in expediting science's demolition of the manifest image by kicking away whatever pseudo-transcendental props are being used to shore it up or otherwise inhibit the corrosive potency of science's metaphysical subtractions." (p26)
However, most of the online material is devoted to Churchland's Eliminative Materialism and a heap of rhetoric equating the entire life of the mind - and with it, culture - to folk psychology. Brassier's diatribes against the 'manifest image' are desperate to the point of absurdity.
Something is terribly wrong here. To begin with, the Sellars distinction between manifest image and scientific image is woefully inadequate, since there is a vast gap into which something like a 'literary image' should fit. Folk psychology is at base just a poor quality scientific theory which shares the same assumptions as most scientific theories which attempt to deal with that most complicated phenomenon, the human. Here is Churchland: "'Folk psychology' denotes the pre-scientific, commonsense conceptual framework that all normally socialized humans deploy in order to comprehend, predict, explain and manipulate the behaviour of humans and the higher animals." (p11. My italics. Note that 'deploy' is a term often used for military purposes.)
If, as Brassier has Churchland saying, truth-as-correspondence is abandoned, then the whole theory turns on evolution as teleology; that is to say, Churchland requires, or assumes, that humans behave as if they are living in a world of abject survival. If that were the case, what matters is our ability to understand and master nature and others around us. Thus it seems that Churchland himself can accept the congruity between quantum physics and wielding hammers which Brassier cannot (on p8).
So perhaps consciousness was 'selected' because it made for more sophisticated responses to danger. But times have changed. Living in our society slackens the life-or-death tension in all of us, effecting both a blossoming of feckless idiots and the rare flowering of those subtle souls whose inner life has transcended the survivalist thinking of their predecessors. The demystification that neuroscience will complete spells the end of passion and thought for those who already have none.
There are multifarious, often perverse joys to be found in the first-person perspective, a perspective which certainly does not function according to propositional logic (that some thoughts or feelings are propositional well explains why we can be confounded by the illogic of our own minds'). If the 'manifest image' is not as it should be, the thoughtful among us will not be oppressed by this image and its inadequacies, but will subvert the available language to serve our own purposes. As for the man-in-the-street, his thinking is so filled with muddled pseudo-science that 'his' manifest image is now only a faint shadow of the scientific image.
So although absorptions, subordinations and fusions can be conceived of regarding the manifest and scientific images, they cannot properly be understood to relate to first- and third-person points of view - although technoscientific capitalism is making great progress on behalf of the third-person by ensuring everybody is alienated from themselves - and it is the possibility of diminishing the import of the first-person perspective that Brassier appears to be concerned with.
Nevertheless, his aims sound genuinely interesting, especially since many of my projects (Bergson, Adorno etc) consist in knocking phenomenology down and seeing if it gets up again. But the days of the Cartesian subject are over. It is now the world which promises - or is made to promise - unrestricted access, whilst the windows of the mind have been frosted into opacity by, most notably, those infamous masters of suspicion. The inward enquiry is no longer a search for answers; only problems, mysteries, issue from those murky depths. Thoughts, drives, emotions, willings, reflections, feelings, passions: these give to thought.
To conclude: in short, the chapter feels a bit like hiring a prostitute then having to accompany her for the last three hours of her shift as a carer for the mentally ill, before seeing a return on one's investment.